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The economic crisis of the 1930‟s hit Norway when Ragnar Frisch returned from the US to 
accept a professorship at University of Oslo. On his return he wrote newspaper articles 
proposing tax relief and monetary policies to fight the economic crisis. Frisch abandoned his 
monetary policies and developed his Oslo School emphasising mathematical models, 
econometrics, national accounts, and detailed state governance. For the next four decades this 
School dominated economic policy in Norway where market forces had been substituted with 
administrative decision making. Keynes, with his General Theory, pointed out that a market 
economy with an active government can secure full employment. When the ideas of the Oslo 
School were challenged at the end of the 1970‟s, by academics and through the poor performance 
of the economy, it collapsed.  A decentralised market economy was reintroduced and The 
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The purpose of this paper is first, to investigate how Keynes‟ economic theories and policy 
recommendations were introduced into Norway. Second, to describe the different roads selected 
by the Keynesians and by the members of the Oslo School. Third to discuss the Oslo School‟s 
attitudes to Keynes and finally to outline their differences related to the market economy. 
 
2. Background 
The world economic crisis at the end of the 1920‟s and beginning of the 1930‟s hit Norway more 
severely than most other European countries. Production decreased and unemployment reached 
levels that had not been seen before. As an example GDP per capita fell by more than 8 % in 
1931, unemployment among members of the Federation of Trade Unions was almost 19% and 
during the winter of 1931-32 unemployment among union members rose sharply. In the winter 
of 1932-33 unemployment among union members rose to more than 40% and across the entire 
labour force it was more than 15 %. Although people at that time had more respect for the 
authorities than today this situation caused serious social unrest. There were strikes, shops were 
plundered and managers of poor relief offices were beaten up. A long succession of “crisis 
entrepreneurs” came up with all kinds of proposals to solve the crisis. Devaluation, increased 
public employment, works service for young men and marketing campaign to create optimism 
only to mention a few.  
This was the situation when the two professors of economics, Ingar Wedervang (1891-
1961) and Oskar Jæger (1863-1933) managed in 1931, by extensive lobbing both inside the 
University of Oslo and vis-à-vis the politicians, to convince the Parliament to create a 
professorship in economics and statistics for Ragnar Frisch (1895-1973). Frisch then made the 
decision to decline an attractive offer of a tenured professorship from Yale University and 
returned to Oslo. 
The outcome of these events had, according to Bjerkholt (2000) a major influence on the 
career of Ragnar Frisch as well as on the development of empirical social science in Norway.
2 He 
could have added that it also has had a major influence on state economic planning and the 
economic development of post war Norway. 
Ragnar Frisch had, as the only child, been appointed to take over his family‟s goldsmith 
business. However he chose to study Political Economy at the University of Oslo and he 
graduated with distinction in 1919. The year after he also took the examination to became a 
certified goldsmith. But his study of economics had caught his interest. He received a 
scholarship, and in the next three years he studied economics, mathematics and statistics in 
France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and the United States. In 1925 he became a research 
assistant on a research programme in production theory. In 1926 Frisch defended his doctoral 
thesis „Sur un probl￨me d‟￩conomie pure‟ at the Faculty of Mathematical and Natural Sciences. The 
year after he received a three year Rockefeller Scholarship and went again to the US. In 1929 he 
became associate professor at the University of Oslo.  
 
3. Frisch and the Economic Crisis 
Frisch had in his early career not been concerned with the present economic problems. However, 
when he returned from his second visit to the US he began to show a strong and growing interest 
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in economic policy. The background for this change was the world depression and its effect in 
Norway as described above.  
Frisch was in 1930-31 again in the US. He stayed at Yale University as an invited guest of 
Irvin Fisher (1867-1947), who was a well known economist who both politicians and academics 
listened  to.
3  Fischer favoured the tools of the Federal Reserve over public works or other 
financial instruments that the government could use to fight unemployment. The reason was that 
he believed that the key to stabilisation was to influence the value of money. Increas ing prices 
would lead to increase in production and lower unemployment and falling prices would lead to a 
decrease in the activity level and an increase in unemployment. The Federal Reserve could change 
interest rates, it could change the banks liquidity reserve rates and it could use market operations. 
Fisher was in 1946 created honorary doctor at the University of Oslo. 
Frisch had a very productive period during his stay at Yale University.
4 Munthe (1999) 
claims that Frisch was strongly influenced by his  host Fisher and other American economists.
5 
When he returned from Yale in 1931 he advocated tax relief and monetary policies as the 
economic instruments to move the Norwegian economy out of the crisis.  
  In the spring of 1932 Frisch gave three radio lectures on The Business Cycles. These lectures 
were printed in the series The University‟s Radio Lectures. Here he strongly attacked what he called 
the saving mania in both the private and public sector of the economy.
6 
Since it was the Parliament that in 1931  came up with the money for his professorship 
Frisch felt he had an obligation to give something back. In the autumn of 1932 he therefore took 
the initiative and managed to arrange some  private meetings; with the prime minister and his 
staff, with prominent parliamentarians of the non socialist parties and with the leaders of trade 
and industry. In these meetings he presented his views on the crisis and his remedies to cure it. 
But, he did not succeed in convincing these people that his ideas could solve the  economic 
problems. Frisch has later said that “it was like hitting his head against a wall” and that “their 
dilutions were many”.
7 However, this opposition inspired him to put his ideas into writings.  
In January 1933 Frisch therefore wrote three articles in the daily newspaper Dagbladet. 
These  articles where published in  a little  brochure  Sparing og circulasjons-regulering  (Savings and 
circulation regulation).
8 Here he presented his thoughts about the causes of the present economic 
crisis and his ideas of how it would be possible to get out of it. His basic point was, at this time, 
that the crisis was not a production or poverty crisis, but a turnover and organisation crisis. It was 
therefore his opinion that it was not necessary with fundamental changes in the economic system. 
His arrangement built on the present system of private ownership. What was needed was a public 
system, which did not directly involve itself in production life but, influenced it indirectly by 
removing the special turnover and organisational bottlenecks. 
It was in the monetary system that Frisch saw the reason for the artificial economic 
downturn or crisis and as a consequence it was here that the planned corrections should be 
targeted. The monetary policies had in his opinion been governed by certain “monetary fictions” 
which in three different ways had caused the depression; 1) a skewed distribution of purchasing 
power between branches and sectors, 2) a skewed distribution of purchasing power between 
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economic classes and 3) the so called “encapsulating phenomena”. Frisch put greatest emphasize 
on the last phenomena. By this he meant the fear mentality that developed during a depression. 
This fear had as an effect that businesses, branches and even nations started to behave like the 
trolls in Ibsen‟s Peer Gynt – „be thyself enough‟. All economic actors reduced their use of other 
commodities and services and did not dare to place new orders before they realised that their 
own sales had increased.   
The objective of the government, according to Frisch, should be to utilize all available 
resources, both labour and capital. The state should not only redistribute purchasing power. It 
should also increase the supply through tax relief. Here it was essential that the deficit was not 
financed with loans in the market, which were in competition with private loans, but with an 
increase in credit. Public works were not a part of his plan. He wanted to increase the activity in 
society by stimulating consumption. When the economy had reached its equilibrium with full 
employment, the government should “withdraw from the play”.  
The  analysis  and  recommendations  in  these  articles  were  harshly  reviewed  by  Ole 
Colbjørnsen (1897-1973), financial expert in the daily newspaper Arbeiderbladet. This newspaper 
was at the time the main media outlet for the socialist Labour Party. Colbjørnsen attacked the 
professor for giving benefits to people that already earned so much that they had no problems in 
paying tax. Why not give the support to the unemployed? Or even better: Why not use the 
money to put people to work? He claimed that Frisch was just scratching the surface of the crisis 
and  that  he  should  have  been  discussing  the  problems  of  private  capitalism  and  its  basic 
weaknesses. Furthermore he asserted that Frisch was far behind his more progressive Nordic 
colleagues and mentioned Bertil Ohlin. Frisch‟ proposals were just another example of a reflation 
initiated by the government. He was surprised that Frisch did not embrace the programme of the 
Labour party and that he did not see that private capitalism had failed and that the road forward 
was a socialist planned economy. Frisch counterattacked and claimed that the main weakness 
with  Colbjørnsens  planned  economy  was  that  he  did  not  put  enough  emphasize  on  private 
initiative. According to Frisch a planned economy had to be organised in such a rational way 
“that one can utilize the tremendous energy source which is implied in the will and initiative of 
each individual”.
9 
Surprisingly the discussion between the two had in a short time the consequence that they 
started to cooperate. How this came about is, according to Munthe (1995), not clarified but it is 
known that Frisch in the autumn of 1933 had a private meeting with the top parliamentarians of 
the Labour party and that this meeting changed his opinion.
10  
  The fact is that Frisch and Colbjørnsen started a fruitful collaboration and that they 
together took part in the development and making of the Labour party‟s crisis plan of 1934. Here 
Frisch gave up his proposal about tax relief and accepted the proposal for a strong increase in 
public spending and that it should be partly financed by an increase in taxes. He was however, at 
this time, more occupied with the monetary aspects of the crisis plan. Colbjørnsen on the other 
hand accepted that increased public spending should be partly financed by loans. His major 
concern was the effect on the real economy. He had also in 1933, together with Axel Sømme 
(1899-1991), written En norsk 3-års plan” ( A Norwegian 3-year plan) where the state should 
heavily invest in the economy as a first step to a fully socialist economy.
11 He strongly believed 
that private investment was not capable of curing unemployment. Only the state could do it and 
the state would be more rational than private businesses. 
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4. How Did Keynes’ Ideas Come to Norway? 
The economic crises at the end of the 1920‟s and the beginning of the 1930‟ caused, as already 
mentioned, a sharp rise in unemployment. The Norwegian government appointed in 1930 an 
Unemployment Committee. This committee ended its work two years later with a White Paper. It 
discussed thoroughly the problems that the Norwegian economy was faced with. The committee 
did not come up with many new solutions. However, it had a minority view pointing to the 
weakness of a capitalist society. The Committee also had a section in which it analyzed and pointed 
to specific problems in each industry. This discussion was taken up and further discussed in a 
radical manner in the above mentioned 3 year plan. This publication created quite a disturbance 
and debate. According to Munthe (1999), this was partly, due to the fact that one of the authors, 
Colbjørnsen, had been in the service of the general staff of the Soviet planning directorate.
12  
Ole Colbjørnsen had been a brilliant student in mathematics and physics at the University 
of Oslo during World War I. The university‟s most prominent researchers, the professors Lars 
Vegard and Carl Størmer hired him as their research and teaching assistant. He also belonged to a 
small group of scholars and students who managed to invite Albert Einstein for a visit to the 
university.  
Colbj￸rnsen‟ superiors predicted that he could have had a bright career in the world of 
physics. However, he experienced a political awakening and became engulfed in politics on the 
left side of the  political  spectrum.  He  became  a glowing Marxist and joined the  Norwegian 
Communist Party. He saw the Soviet state as the proper “land of dawn” and wanted to take 
active  part  in  this  historical  project.  He  learned  the  Russian  language,  contacted  the  Soviet 
ambassador  and  went  into  Soviet  service.  First,  in  1921,  he  became  director  of  the  Soviet 
telegraph bureau Rosta. In the years 1922-28 he worked for the Soviet Foreign Trade Service in 
Oslo. Here he worked mostly as director of the finance division and as a trade director, but he 
also  worked in  Moscow,  Arkhangelsk and Leningrad.  The business of the  trade service  was 
mainly to organize the export of Soviet wood products. During these years he also worked as a 
consultant in  connection with the  organization and development of the Soviet  foreign  trade 
monopoly and the preparation of the first Soviet 5 year plan. In his work he made visits to the 
trade services London office. This lead him to  his new position,  and  from1929  to 1931 he 
worked as director of a Soviet shipping company in London, which took care of the Soviet 
timber export.  
However, he became increasingly skeptical to Stalin‟s dictatorship, and at the end of 1931 
he defected from Soviet service, and moved back to Norway.
13 In 1932 he became, as mentioned 
above, a financial journalist in the daily newspaper  Arbeiderbladet, a post he held until the Nazi-
German attack on Norway in 1940.
 14  
During his years in London, Colbjørnsen followed very closely the new developments in 
British economic policy. He was also impressed by the change that took place in the attitudes of 
economists like William Beveridge and John Maynard Keynes.
15 Both Beveridge and Keynes were 
very much concerned with the practical consequences of the economic crisis in general and the 
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unemployment problem in particular. Both took active part in the political debate. Although 
Colbjørnsen  still  believed  that  a  democratic  socialist  planned  economy  was  the  best  he  was 
impressed by Keynes views that it was possible with an active state to secure full employment in a 
society based on a market economy. 
At the end of the 1920‟s and first half of the 1930‟s Keynes, in newspaper articles and, 
pamphlets,  actively  proposed  his  ideas,  in  a  language  that  politician  and  lay  people  could 
understand, about what should be done to cure the crisis, The theoretical basis for these ideas he 
later  expressed  in  his  book  The  General  Theory  of  Employment,  Interest  and  Money,  which  was 
published 1936.   
According to Munthe (1999), in a section called Keynes before Keynes, his views are most 
pronounced in a pamphlet written for the English Liberal Party in May 1928 entitled: Can Lloyd 
George do it? That is, can the leader of the party and the candidate to be the next prime minister 
keep  his  promise  to  reduce  unemployment?  Keynes,  who  was  a  strong  supporter  of  Lloyd 
George, answered with a booming yes: By using 100 hundred million pounds a year could half a 
million unemployed  be given work.  They  could build  houses, roads,  railways, telephone  and 
telegraph  lines,  and  they  could  drain  marshland  so  the  agricultural  area  could  be  extended. 
Keynes claimed that the increased incomes would give the government higher taxes and that 
these together with a reduction in the defense budget would be sufficient to make the works self 
financed. The Government debt would therefore not increase. In the back of these computations 
„the multiplier‟ can of course be seen. 
The Liberal Party before the election in 1929 came up with the slogans; We can conquer 
unemployment  and  Let  us  mobilize  for  prosperity.    Keynes  supported  its  proposals  against  the 
bureaucrats in  the  Ministry  of Finance, who thought these  proposals were extravagance and 
would  cause  inflation  and bankruptcy.  They  also claimed  that public investments would  not 
reduce unemployment because it would oust private investments. Increased public investments 
would increase the demand for savings and since savings were limited this would increase the 
interest rate, which in turn would make private investments unprofitable. The basic view of the 
ministry was that savings was scare and Keynes had to go into extensive discussion to show that 
this was not the case. 
Colbj￸rnsen followed this debate, accepted Keynes‟ views and brought Keynes proposals 
with him when he returned to Norway. As a financial journalist he wrote numerous articles 
advocating these proposals and solutions to the economic problems Norway was faced with. 
These articles were again, according to Munthe, “more influenced by the liberal English economists than 
by Lenin and his disciples”.
 16 
 At this time the economic policy in Norway was not so different from what was the case 
in United Kingdom. The non socialist parties had a clear majority in the parliament, Stortinget, 
but  could  not  agree  to  form  a  strong  government.  The  socialist  Labour  Party  had  not  yet 
recovered from the internal feud between the socialists in the 1920‟s. Until 1932 the political 
slogan was “Vente på bedre bør” (Let us wait for fair wind), and the economic policy built on the 
principle  that  the  government  and  local  municipalities  should  save.  As  a  consequence  they 
claimed that the burdens on the private business life would be less and the activity would be 
increased.  
The Labour Party had until 1932 not an alternative to this short term policy. However 
this changed when Colbjørnsen arrived on the scene. Inspired by Keynes but also building on his 
experience working with the Soviet 5 year plan, he started a series of articles in Arbeiderbladet. His 
main points were that the crisis with its massive unemployment was unnecessary and could, even 
in  a non socialist society,  be avoided with efficient intervention by the  state.  In the  already 
mentioned Norwegian 3-year plan a cohesive expansive anti crisis policy was presented. At the same 
time he took active part in the creation of the Labour party programme before the 1933 election. 
Before this election the Labour Party had advocated revolution, Colbjørnsen showed another 
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way. He stated that it was ridiculous in a relative poor country to have hundred of thousands 
unemployed. “We can not be poorer by working” was his central message. With Colbj￸rnsen‟s 
slogan  “The  whole  people  at  work”  and  a  reasonable  cohesive  economic  program  to  bring  the 
country out of the crisis the Labour Party got more than 40 % of the vote.  
In 1934 Colbj￸rnsen and Frisch started to collaborate. In the Labour Party‟s 1934 crisis 
plan they wrote important sections together. Frisch did not any longer praise private initiative and 
tax relief and Colbjørnsen on the other hand toned down his Soviet type production steering. 
Together they, without saying it, advocated policies that Keynes had proposed 5 years earlier. 
Proposals  for  extraordinary  grants  to  roads,  railroads,  telegraph  and  emergency  works  were 
forwarded. Emergency works could be financed by loans. 
When the Labour Party formed the government after the 1935 Parliament election they 
could have put their crisis plan into effect. However, this did not happen. Colbjørnsen was seen 
as a theorist, and maybe some even questioned his loyalty because of his years in Soviet service, 
he therefore did not get an appointment in the government. Frisch was also seen as theorist and 
an unpractical politician. His proposals were unrealistic and he had a tendency to “shoot pigeons 
with cannons” it was said.   
The new government, with Johan Nygaardsvold as prime minister, did not follow the 
crisis plan and neither did they carry out policies recommended by Keynes and his followers. The 
budget was kept in balance and the grants for public works were rather small. The government 
carried, according to Vogt (1961), out a direct contractive fiscal policy. In his opinion could these 
years be seen as the years of neglected possibilities.
17 However, the business cycle turned in 1935, 
partly because of the rearmament in Germany, and the economic situation gradually improved.  
Both Colbjørnsen and Frisch were disappointed. Colbjørnsen, as a Member of Parliament 
and an economic j ournalist,  moved  away  from  Keynesian  policies  and  advocated  “industrial 
socialism”. The state should through an active industrial policy invest in manufacturing industries 
that should compete with and squeeze out private capital. Frisch with his research and the new 
study program at the University of Oslo, whose first graduates completed their studies in 1939, 
concentrated on building up what later was called the  Oslo  School.  He became increasingly 
skeptical to a market economy and advocated more and more a centrally planned economy. 
World War II, with the Norwegian government in exile in London, gave the proponents of 
“industrial socialism” breathing space to develop the institutional and judicial system that was 
necessary for a centrally planned economy in Norway after the war. 
 
5. The Rise and Fall of the Oslo School
18 
The year after he had been appointed professor he also became one of the directors of the 
Institute of Economics. The other director was Ingar Wedervang. He and Frisch had in 1930 
written an application to the Rockefeller Foundation for financial support for the establishment 
of an Institute of Economic Research. This application was granted, on the condition that Frisch 
would be one of the directors. When Wedervang left to be the rector of the newly founded 
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration in 1937, Frisch became its sole 
director, a position he held until 1960. 
As professor of economics and statistics, and as one of the directors of the Institute of 
Economics, Frisch started his grand project of bringing economics as a science out of „the fog‟. He 
fought against what he called „fictional economics‟ and his enemies, and they were at the time many, 
belonged to what he called „the unenlightened plutocracy (pengeveldet)‟. He believed that economic 
theory had to be based on mathematical models and quantitative analysis. The new economics 
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should be shaped in a precise mathematical language. Mathematics gave a greater precision to 
study the consequences of given assumptions. It was only with mathematical models that it 
would be possible to carry out complicated analysis and reasoning. He promoted these ideas with 
enthusiasm, genius and force.  
On the strength of his research, a new study programme, the new staff he recruited and 
his ability to brush all resistance aside, he succeeded, in a few years, to create his own school 
within economics. This Oslo School could be characterised by; the use of mathematical models, 
the development of econometrics, development of national accounts and macroeconomic 
planning models. In addition it could be described by an increasingly strong scepticism to the use 
of market forces and a strong belief in a centrally planned economy with detailed state 
governance. Finally, in spite of Frisch‟s international experience, it had little interest in the 
international debate about the feasibility and efficiency of planned economies.  
The first students from the new study programme graduated in 1939. When the 
government 1940 had to go into exile in London after the German occupation of Norway, some 
of these graduates joined it. Here they immediately started to make plans for the Norwegian 
economy after the war. When the war ended in 1945 these „old‟ graduates together with the „new‟ 
graduates took over important positions in the ministries. The Institute of Economics, the 
research department in the Bureau of Statistics and the planning department in the Ministry of 
Finance were called the „Iron Triangle‟. Focus was on macroeconomic planning and politics in a 
detailed regulated economy, where free market forces to a large extent had been eliminated. The 
Norwegian planned economy developed features in these post war years that were very close to 
the planned economies of Eastern Europe. 
Two professors, in addition to Ragnar Frisch, played an important role in the 
development of the Oslo School. Trygve Haavelmo (1911-1999) had joined Frisch as a research 
assistant already in 1933. Since this time he and Frisch worked closely together only interrupted 
by the war. In 1938 Haavelmo was visiting professor at University of Aarhus and in 1939 
research fellow at Harvard University. Caught in the US by the war he worked for Nortraship, an 
organisation set up by the Norwegian government in exile and Norwegian ship owners, to 
administer the war effort of the Norwegian merchant marine. After the war he stayed a year with 
Cowles Commission in Chicago, where he, according to Schumpeter (1954), „exerted an influence 
that would credit to the lifetime work of a professor‟.
19 His doctoral thesis entitled The Probability 
Approach in Econometrics from 1944 should be mentioned since he showed that the results of many 
of the methods used thus far had been misleading.  Returning to Norway he was appointed 
professor of economics in 1948, a position he held until his retirement in 1979. With his many 
important research contributions, his teaching, and his generosity and gentle personality, he had a 
decisive influence on the development of economics. He won the Nobel Memorial Prize in 1989 
for his fundamental contribution to econometrics.  
Leif Johansen (1930-82) entered the University of Oslo in 1948 and became the assistant 
of Frisch in 1951. Since that year they worked closely together. When Frisch retired in 1965 
Johansen took over his chair. Among Johansen‟s most important contribution was his doctoral 
dissertation, A Multi-Sectoral Study of Economic Growth from 1961, which became the basis for the 
long-term economic planning by the Ministry of Finance. Macroeconomic planning, research and 
policy, became the alpha and omega in the Norwegian post war economy. With Johansen, 
economic planning became a very strong discipline in the study programme in economics at the 
University of Oslo. His Lectures on economic planning became a standard work to be used for 
students as well as economic planners.  
As a consequence of his involvement with the Labour Party and his close collaboration 
with Colbjørnsen Frisch developed a deep mistrust in the market economy and the working of 
the price mechanism. National economic planning administered and managed by well-trained 
economists was, in his opinion, clearly superior to the volatility of a market led economy. As a 
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consequence, Frisch as well as Johansen, who was a member of the Moscow oriented Norwegian 
Communist Party, were great admirers of the Soviet economic planning system, and claimed that 
it was superior to the market economies of the Western world. They were therefore not easily 
attuned to other ideas.  
Frisch and his supporters questioned the ability of a free market economy to effectively 
allocate resources. He compared the economist to a social engineer who has a toolkit of new 
mathematical planning models, a system of detailed national accounts and detailed regulations 
and controls of the economy. This he believed would help assist the politicians in government 
and parliament to develop the welfare state.  
In the first two decades after the war there was no challenge to the Oslo School and its 
strong emphasis on economic planning and detailed state governance of economic life. This 
changed in the 1970‟s when the basic characteristics of the Oslo School were challenged by 
academics and by the poor performance of the economy.  
The build up of the academic challenge started in 1959, when Karl H. Borch (1919-1986) 
was recruited to the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, an institution 
not strongly focused on research. Now this changed, the new competence-building and the 
international recognition achieved by Borch and his colleagues became a challenge to the Oslo 
School, and slowly broke its monopoly and its influence on economics and politics. More 
emphasis was placed on the functioning of competitive markets under uncertainty.  
The second challenge came in the 1970‟s when it became clear to the majority of both 
economists and politicians that the results from the elaborate system of detailed state planning 
and governance were rather poor and that economic planning in the Oslo School tradition was 
not able to secure competitiveness and economic growth of the Norwegian economy. A 
Government appointed Committee concluded in 1977 that a decentralised market economic 
system would be better able to tackle the challenges than a centralised economic planning system. 
This changed the economic policies and the results were that during the 1990‟s the elaborate 
system of detailed economic planning and control connected to the Oslo School had come to an 
end. Today only the use of mathematical models, econometrics and national accounts are left of 
the Oslo School. 
 
6. Keynes and the Oslo School 
As mentioned, John Maynard Keynes, was at the beginning of the 1930‟s a well known name 
among  Norwegian  university  economists.  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace  from  1919,  in 
which he directed a fierce criticism against the Peace Treaty of Versailles and where he predicted 
a  rather  dismissal  future  for  the  German  and European  economies,  had  made  him  a  rather 
famous or infamous economist. It did not make things better that his predictions turned out to 
be true. In addition he had a large production of books, scientific articles, and last but not least 
pamphlets and newspaper articles.   
When The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money was published in 1936 economics 
regained its position as a science that could give constructive advice to the politicians on how we 
could get out of the crisis. The publishing has in posterity been seen as a turning point in the 
history of economic science. It won from the very beginning an enthusiastic audience, particularly 
among the young economists, who had been waiting for a prescription to fight the economic 
crisis. Paul Samuelson expressed it in this way. “Bliss was in dawn to be alive, but to be young was very 
heaven”.
20Furthermore he claimed that the one under 35 years was “contaminated”, but that the one 
more  than  50  never  got  it.  The  one  in  between  came  gradually  to  accept  the  new  theory, 
sometimes without knowing it themselves. England and the US were soon won for the new 
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theory. However, the reaction in Scandinavia was rather cool. The Swedes said straight out that 
what was important in the book was old news for the Stockholm School. In addition they had 
many critical comments. 
  In Oslo there was in the beginning a remarkable silence. With his early emphasis on 
consumption rather than investment Frisch, and most of his colleagues at the University, had a 
different approach to what could bring the economies out of the crisis than Keynes and also the 
Stockholm School. They had both made a point of an increase in investment as the necessary 
first step to a fight a downturn in the business cycle.  In other respects was their thinking quite 
similar. However there is no evidence that Frisch‟s policies to fight the crisis had even indirectly 
been influenced by Keynes. Keynes was, according to Frisch only one of many in “this group of 
modern money theoreticians who had worked their way to an „active‟ view”.
21This implied that Frisch was of 
the opinion that K eynes, when his  General  Theory  was  published,  was  not  such  an  inventive 
scholar as Keynes liked to present himself. His stroke of genius, was not his ideas or theories but 
in his way of presentation, that is how his “thoughts are combined and described”. The book was 
“forcible,  pointedly and  convincingly”,  but  Frisch  added  that  it  “by  no means  was  everywhere  clear  and 
pr￩cis”.
22 
Actually, Frisch rather expressed an irritation that Keynes had not caught up with the 
latest developments in the science to understand that there was relatively little news in the 
content of the book. Frisch had undoubtedly right when he claimed that an expansive policy was 
not a new thing. Norwegian university economists had favoured the idea about budget deficits, 
even with no antecedent saving, a few years before the  General Theory. What separated Keynes 
from  Frisch  was  primarily  that  he  developed  a  macroeconomic  theory  that  supported  an 
expansive policy. This had not been a concern for Frisch. And when the so-called Keynesian 
revolution was more a theoretical than a political overturning, Keynes can be said to be more 
original than what Frisch thought. 
Frisch scepticism toward Keynes was also connected with their different views on the 
methodology  of  economics.  Keynes  did  not  think  much  of  econometrics.  In  addition  he 
undoubtedly sinned against the rules that Frisch had listed for correct model building. In Frisch‟s 
opinion Keynes was not explicit enough in his assumptions or sufficient precise in his logical 
conclusions. He also did not see the same need as Frisch for empirical investigations. 
  When the reviews of The General Theory in foreign journals grew to a literature and the 
impact also hit the general public the silence of the Oslo economists became intolerable. The 
situation demanded a reaction. When it finally came it was positive. John Maynard Keynes was 
created honorary doctor of the University of Oslo in March 1938. The distance between Frisch 
and Keynes was not greater than that Frisch, on this occasion, cooperated with his colleagues, 
but it was professor Keilhau and the later professor Erling Petersen, who was in charge of the 
honorary doctor degree ceremony. On this occasion Professor Keilhau also wrote an article in 
Statsøkonomisk Tidskrift.
23 At the end of this article he touched  The General Theory. “In one way, 
however, the reception of The General Theory raise a rather interesting psychological problem: Why is it that this 
book, which is so exaggerated in its critique and which in many of its ways of thinking stop half way, from a huge 
audience is created with excitement and even in certain circles has won the reputation of being an epoch making 
pioneering work.” As late as 1940 Frisch and Keilhau published a collection of “original texts” from 
great works in economics. This collection has not a single sentence from  The General Theory, 
however, it contains a section from a Treatise on Probability which Keynes published in 1921. They 
were perhaps of the opinion that this work was his most valuable contribution to economics. 
It was therefore other economists than Frisch that introduced Keynes to the students at 
the University of Oslo. To some degree it was the students themselves that had started to read 
The General Theory, but University lecturer Erling Petersen started to lecture on the book already in 
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1937.  In  1948  he  published,  based  on  his  lectures,  his  memorandum  from  the  Institute  of 
Economics;  Hovedtrekkene  i  Keynes  General  Theory  (The  main  principles  of  Keynes  „General 
Theory‟). Here he stressed that; “Keynes theory was primarily a theory of employment. Therefore it has also 
been a theory of no employment or unemployment”. Petersen‟s memorandum was used by students until 
the end of the 1960‟s. 
Frisch did not teach on Keynes theory at the University of Oslo, but in a preface to a 
memorandum written by his colleague Kreyberg from 1961 he wote:  
“In the spring of 1957 I should give a series of lectures on economic planning in Holland, it occurred to 
me that it could be useful to bring with me some notes on Keynes theory in case it, beside the more thorough 
technical oriented lectures on planning, could be requests for some popular lectures on his theory. I had very little 
time and was happy when Kreyberg on the spot made some excellent pencil notes, which I could have in my pocket 
if needed. As it turned out there was no need for the notes, however they accompanied me on several trips to Cairo 
where I should give advice on economic planning.”  
So at last he had come to the conclusion that a presentation of Keynes theory could be 
valuable for the students of economics. 
In his lectures in 1957 and 1958, on economic policy, University lecturer Bjørn Thalberg 
discussed parts of Keynes‟ General Theory in his use of Alvin Hansen‟s textbook Monetary Theory 
and Fiscal Policy.  He found that his students had a need for, and actually also demanded, an exact 
analytical description of the main points in the book. His lectures was therefore published as a 
memorandum from the Institute of Economics in 1959 and used as a text for the students for the 
next 10-15 years. 
During the first half of the 1960‟s Professor Leif Johansen lectured on public finance. 
These lectures he published in two volumes as Offentlig økonomikk (Public Economics) in 1965.
24 
This book became for the next two decades a standard textbook in public finance for Norwegian 
students of economics. Strangely enough, given Johansen‟s political views and his emphasise on 
central economic planning, he decided to write the book  “within the framework of macroeconomic 
models of the Keynes type”.
25 With this book Keynes and his economic theory had won a secure place 
in the teaching of economics for Norwegian students. These students, according to Berg & 
Hanisch (1984), viewed macroeconomics and Keynes models as the same.
26 
 
7. The Oslo School and Keynes on Econometrics 
The Econometric Society was established in 1931, with Frisch as one of its founders. Two years 
later he became the first editor of the association‟s journal Econometrica, a position he held for the 
next  20  years.    In  the  statutes  of  the  association  it  is  stated  that  it  should  work  for  “the 
advancement of economic theory in relation to statistics and mathematics”. Although Frisch was 
one the founders of the association and did quite a lot of work to advance this field he can, 
according to Berg & Hanisch (1984), not be said to be an econometrician if today‟s definition is 
used.  He worked only sporadic on proper econometric problems, which are the integration of 
economic theory and data with the assistance of recent mathematical statistics. Frisch left these 
problems first of all to be solved by Haavelmo. He had carried out applied econometric work 
before the war at both the Institute of Economics at University of Oslo, and at University of 
Aarhus in Denmark, where he was a reader in the academic year 1938-39. During his stay in the 
US from 1939 until 1947, where he also worked for the Cowles commission, his main emphasize 
was theory and questions of methodology. His most important works from this period were; The 
Inadequacy of Testing Dynamic Theory by Comparing Theoretical Solutions and Observed Cycles (1940), The 
Statistical Implications of  a System of  Simultaneous  Equations  (1943) and  The  Probability Approach  in 
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Econometrics (1944). All three were published in Econometrica. The last was his doctoral dissertation. 
As a result of his work there he was recognized as one of the worlds leading econometrician. The 
Dutch  Jan  Tinbergen  wrote  that;  “Dr.  Haavelmo  is  one  of  the  best  experts  in  statistical  analysis  of 
econometric problems”.  
Haavelmo  fought  also  against  Keynes  and  others  who  had  expressed  views  that 
mathematical statistics was unfit for economic analysis. One could almost get the feeling, said 
Haavelmo that Lord Keynes had; “a secret knowledge of some other, different method that is capable of 
solving these problems which statistical inference, allegedly, cannot answer; that the introduction of probability terms 
does violence to the nature of economic facts”.  Haavelmo claimed that it was not “dangerous” to treat 
economic  variables  as  stochastic  variables.  Actually  this  was  the  only  way  to  formulate 
meaningful hypotheses in relation to facts and “these notions are precisely the tools needed for an objective 
and intelligent discussion of such questions as those of Lord Keynes quoted above”.
 27    
In the years 1938-39 there was a debate between Keynes and Tinbergen about logic and 
the use of econometrics. In this debate Keynes had strongly hinted that Tinbergen had gone too 
far in his use of mathematical statistics:  
“The worst of him is that he is much more interested in getting on with the job than in spending time 
deciding whether the job is worth getting on with. He so clearly prefers the mazes of arithmetic to the mazes of logic,  
that I must ask him to forgive the criticisms of one whose tastes in statistical theory have been, beginning many 
years ago, the other way around.”
28  
Keynes probably referred to his own book A Treatise on Probability from 1922. However, 
Haavelmo
29, was of the opinion that Tinbergen and other econometricians did not go far enough 
and he came up with many proposals in this direction, both critical and constructive ones. The 
most important one was probably his demonstration, of what at that time was a ccepted practise, 
that to estimate parameters in each relation independent of the other relations, on the whole, 
gave uncertain, skewed and inconsistent estimates. He introduced in stead what later was called 
the simultaneous equation method. Tinbergen characterised this work in the following way:  
“The chief points is that, in order to test statistically a system of simultaneous equations, one cannot use 
the method of least square for each of the equations separately. Dr. Haavelmo showed that the tacit assumptions 
behind such a procedure are in fact contradictory to each other. He developed a new method and showed that even if 
one is interested in only one equation between variables which are related by more than one equation, it is generally 
not permitted to use the old least square methods”.  
There is no doubt that Keynes became increasingly sceptical to the emphasis that was put 
on mathematical and statistical analysis by economists in the northern part of Europe. He himself 
became more and more involved with politics. 
 
8. Keynes, the Oslo School and the Market Economy 
John Maynard Keynes presented in his early writings and finally in 1936 with his General Theory, a 
third road as an alternative to socialism and fascism, an active state within the framework of a 
market economy with a democratic constitutional government. His main focus was the activity 
level in the economy as a whole. To what extent is the existing production possibilities utilised? 
This problem, the so called „capacity problem‟ he treats thoroughly. His famous book is, like any 
other theory, not general in the sense that it is relevant regardless of the questions asked of 
institutional conditions or market forms. It is clear that Keynes objective is to analyse the 
„capacity problem‟ in a market economy such as the one in England or similar places in the 
interwar period.  
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He maintained that a decentralised market economy had many good properties which it 
was important to take care of. However, it had all the same weaknesses and Keynes had reached 
the conclusion that it was necessary with major changes and improvements in the capitalist house 
to be able to win over the economic crisis. Especially he meant that the market economy was 
unstable unless someone stabilised it. In a decentralised market economy there can not be found 
a mechanism that automatically make sure that total demand has the right size to secure full 
employment. He therefore rejected the invisible hand in this context. Sometimes the demand will 
be too high and sometimes it will be too small. Business cycle researcher had, according to 
Hanisch et al (1999), for a long time suspected this but Keynes succeeded to a greater extent than 
earlier economists to give a convincing theoretical explanation.
30  
It has been said about Keynes that he saved capitalism or the market economy and, 
according to Søilen (1998), he would probably have been flattered by such an allegation.
31 
Frisch had in the beginning of the 1930‟s supported a market economy and he had 
stressed the importance of private initiative. However, his cooperation with Colbjørnsen led him 
to change his mind and from the middle of the 1930‟s he and his Oslo School became 
increasingly sceptical to the market system as a method for allocating resources and distribute 
goods and services. 
How Frisch‟s views changed is clear from a thirty year correspondence between Frisch 
and Trygve J. B. Hoff (1895-1982), the editor of the Norwegian liberal economic journal 
Farmand. Their exchange of letters began in 1935 and continued, with some interruptions, until at 
least 1964. At the end of the thirties, beginning of the forties, Frisch was convinced that the 
market economic system had utterly failed. He explained his position in a letter to Hoff at the 
end of 1941: 
 “Personally, I believe that we enter a period where more developed forms for industrial regulations will 
come to prominence. They are both unavoidable and, in my opinion, correct as countermeasures against the 
disproportional conditions that have developed. The grotesque outcomes we had in the depression of the 1930s - 
conscious destruction of commodities, permanent unemployment and stationary machinery - was, I would argue, 
mainly caused by certain 'individualistic' features in our economic system.”
32  
Hoff refuted this statement quite coarsely.
33 The economic journal Farmand was closed 
during the Nazi occupation but reopened after the liberation. Here Hoff as editor fought fiercely, 
but in vain, against the Oslo School and the centrally planned economic system that were 
established in Norway after the war.  
  As pointed out in a previous section the graduates from the new study 
programme in economics moved into and took over the government offices. Here they built up a 
detailed regulation system that took over the role of the pre war market economy. When the 
Minister of Finance Erik Brofoss presented the national budget for 1947 to the Parliament he 
explained the reason for the new system:  
“Man has through scientific and technological progress managed to free itself from the violent forces of 
nature. They have managed to break the strings that nature has laid over human lives. It would be a step towards 
increased freedom to be able to free ourselves from the blind submission to the chances in the economic life, which for 
each individual looks like the work of the forces of nature. We have to make ourselves master of the economic forces 
instead of being ruled by them.”
34 
The government should therefore free the nation from the blind economic forces. To do 
this he stated that; “a regulated economy is necessary in a modern society”. As a consequence Norway 
abolished the market economy. 
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Whenever someone argued in favour of a free market economy with free trade Frisch 
took up the lance and rebuked their statements in numerous newspaper articles. Here it is enough 
to mention that he in an article, in the newspaper Arbeiderbladet in 1956, entitled Farlige 
forenklingstendenser i den økonomiske politikken (Dangerous tendencies of simplification in economic 
policy), strongly advocated planning in stead of a free market economy.
35 The year after he wrote 
an article in the newspaper Aftenposten, entitled Kjetterske meninger om frihandel (Heretic opinions on 
free trade).  “If the western democracies persist in basing their economy on the free market they will soon be 
ousted by the eastern countries who now prepare themselves for an expansion under full utilization using rational 
and flexible economic planning.”
36 
The kind of economic planning that Frisch now advocated was built upon 
macroeconomic planning and detailed economic regulation of the economic life. Although he 
still talked about the necessity of intellectual freedom he became a great admirer of the Soviet 
economic planning system. He expressed this view in a letter to Hoff in 1958:  
“The depression that the USA (and partly the other western countries) suffers from at present is, in my 
opinion, further proof of the technical inferiority of a free market economy. It is grotesque that the USA is happy if 
the national product does not sink when one considers that the Soviet Union has a secure and free business cycle 
growth of seven or eight per cent each year.”
 37  
In a later letter he revised these numbers to claim that the economic growth in the Soviet 
Union was about ten per cent each year! Frisch defended what he called “a rational form of economic 
planning” for the rest of his life and claimed that it was superior to a market economy. 
As mentioned in a previous section in the first two decades after the war there was no 
challenge to the Oslo School and its strong emphasis on economic planning and detailed state 
governance of economic life. However, this changed in the 1970‟s when the basic characteristics 
of the Oslo School were challenged by academics. The poor performance of the economy further 
questioned the validity of the Oslo School‟s theory. In 1979 the Committee for Industrial Growth, 
produced its White Paper on problems in Norwegian manufacturing industries.
38 The Committee 
concluded that a decentralised market economy would be better able to tackle the challenges than 
a centralised economic planning system. According to the historian Harald Espeli (1992), the 
proposal from this committee is; “the official Norwegian version of the ideological reorientation to the 
market”.
39 
Although it took some years before all regulations had been abolished there is no doubt 
the Keynesian paradigm emerged as the preferred theory compared to the approach of the Oslo 
School. 
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